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Abstract
Through the use of primary and secondary sources, this essay seeks to define the role of Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, which was essential to avoiding nuclear
devastation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Additionally, the essay examines the
consequences of the crisis including the Sino-Soviet split, the ousting of Khrushchev, and the effects of
continued Cuban-Soviet relations.
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Nikita Khrushchev, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Aftermath 
Jason Roeschley 
 
 The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was one of the most significant events of the 
twentieth century. Because of the actions of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and U.S. 
President John F. Kennedy, nuclear devastation of the globe was avoided. This essay seeks to 
explore Khrushchev‟s role in the crisis and to discuss its effects, including the further Sino-
Soviet split, the downfall of Khrushchev, and Cuban-Soviet relations. 
 The actual crisis began on October 16 and 17 of 1962, when President Kennedy and 
members of his administration saw photos taken by American U-2 of missiles on Cuban soil that 
had nuclear capabilities and a range of over 1,600 kilometers.
1
 The origins of the crisis and 
Khrushchev‟s involvement, however, occurred three months earlier in July when the Premier met 
with Fidel Castro‟s brother Raúl. It was during this week long visit that “the decision was 
[presumably] taken to send to Cuba medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads.”2 But blame 
should not be placed solely on the shoulders of the Premier. Khrushchev would later write in his 
memoirs that the purpose of the placement of nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba was “to maintain 
the independence of the Cuban people” after Kennedy had endorsed the U.S. orchestration of an 
invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961.
 3
 Regardless of which leader bears more 
responsibility and possible ulterior motives for placing the missiles that were not mentioned by 
Khrushchev, Soviet missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and striking the United States 
were erected in Cuba in the fall of 1962, and the Kennedy administration soon found out. 
Although the U.S. had no “direct evidence that the Soviet Union had placed nuclear warheads in 
Cuba,” strong, forceful reactions on part of the United States would take Khrushchev by surprise. 
4
 
 Khrushchev had completely miscalculated the American response to Soviet missiles in 
Cuba, as British diplomat to the Soviet Union, Sir Frank K. Roberts affirmed: “Khrushchev had 
never intended that his Cuban adventure [would] involve any risk of war”.5 Khrushchev himself 
was aware of the logistical disadvantage of any Cuban operations, writing: “It would have been 
preposterous for us to unleash a war against the United States from Cuba. Cuba was 11,000 
kilometers from the Soviet Union. Our sea and air communications with Cuba were so 
precarious that an attack against the US was unthinkable.”6 In addition, the United States had a 
significant military advantage over the Soviet Union at the time.
7
 It is not surprising, then, that 
Khrushchev‟s actions during the crisis underscored his resolve to avoid a nuclear Third World 
War with the United States. 
 When Kennedy announced a blockade of Cuba on Monday, October 22, in order to 
prevent further Soviet ships from reaching the island, Khrushchev could have plowed ahead and 
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sought confrontation, which would have escalated the crisis even further. Though he initially 
ordered the ships to continue en route to Cuba while they were still in international waters, the 
Premier soon decided to order “all Soviet transport ships carrying military cargoes… to halt and 
turn around,” but not other “freighters and tankers.”8 Both Premier Khrushchev and President 
Kennedy shared the will to avoid full-scale war, which contributed to Kennedy‟s decision to 
allow several ships through the quarantine line. in addition to Khrushchev‟s order for ships to 
“stop at the line of blockade and to await further instructions.” 9 As Sir Frank Roberts writes, “It 
was abundantly clear that nuclear war would not erupt by Soviet intention, despite Khrushchev‟s 
entire responsibility for creating the scenario.”10  
Khrushchev‟s actions, however, were not completely without fault, for “almost every day 
Kennedy received a message from Khrushchev [and t]he tone of the first had been 
threatening.”11 The Premier had employed a vocabulary that included words such as “banditry,” 
“folly,” and “imperialism.”12 But soon enough, Khrushchev would become aware of the gravity 
of the situation and the mood of the Americans, thereby modifying his actions. On Friday, 
October 26, ten days after the Kennedy administration saw the U-2 photos, the Premier received 
an intelligence report of plans of a U.S invasion of Cuba.
13
 Khrushchev was shocked; he knew 
then that the United States was serious about removing Soviet missiles from its Cuban neighbor. 
That same day, on October 26, rather than request the removal of certain U.S. missiles in Europe 
as he had previously planned, Premier Khrushchev decided “not to complicate negotiations” and 
only requested in his letter a pledge from Kennedy that the United States would not invade 
Cuba.
14
 He called for both nations to “normalize relations,” stating that “if assurance were given 
by the President… that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would 
restrain others from actions of this sort, if you [the U.S.] would recall your fleet, this would 
immediately change everything.”15 Khrushchev clarified later in that same message that “the 
question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat [to Cuba from the United 
States], then armaments are a burden for every people” and “the necessity for the presence of our 
military specialists in Cuba would disappear.”16 Obviously, Khrushchev desperately wanted to 
avoid a conflict between the two nations and was a willing and easy compromiser – there was no 
other demand in the message, aside from the request for a U.S. pledge to not invade of Cuba. 
 The next day, however, the Premier awoke to news that an invasion would not happen so 
soon. The information related to the threat of invasion was obtained in two informal meetings 
between Soviet embassy official Georgi Kornienko and reporter Warren Rogers.
17
 Khrushchev 
felt that he had “given way to nerves” and was convinced that he “had been in too much of a 
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hurry with his letter to Kennedy.”18  Khrushchev would draft and send a letter that day, October 
27, requesting that the United States “evacuate its analogous weapons from Turkey.”19 The 
withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles would remove what Khrushchev called a “„pistol pointed at 
the head‟ of the Soviet Union.”20 Though Kennedy “ignored the second letter [which included 
the demand to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey] and replied only to the first,” Kennedy 
reassured Khrushchev “through other channels… that American missiles in Turkey would be 
dismantled.”21 The crisis was over.   
As for the effects of the crisis, there are many. To begin, there were the immediate 
outcomes of the negotiations during October. It had been determined that the Soviet Union 
would withdraw its nuclear-capable missiles from Cuba, and in return, the United States would 
pledge not to invade Cuba and promise to dismantle its Jupiter missiles in Turkey. The latter can 
be considered rather insignificant, for the United States had already considered dismantling the 
missiles in Turkey, and it soon replaced them with more effective nuclear rockets that could be 
launched by submarines.
22
 The United States‟ non-invasion pledge yielded more significant 
effects. After a failed invasion, assassination plots, and myriads of other schemes to kill or oust 
Fidel Castro, the USSR succeeded in securing the survival of its fledgling island ally. In addition, 
relations between the two nations “remained firm,” with Fidel Castro taking a forty-day tour of 
the Soviet Union only six months after the resolution of the crisis, despite his previous anger 
over the removal of the missiles.
23
 
However, there were also negative side effects for the Soviet Union concerning its Cuban 
relations, namely, the dependency of Cuba on Soviet economic assistance. After the United 
States eliminated exports of oil and prohibited sugar imports from Cuba, the Soviet Union 
stepped in and footed the bill in order to keep the Cuban economy from collapsing, buying sugar 
that it did not need.
24
 By the early 1980s, Cuba had become a $4.5 billion liability per year for 
the Soviet Union.
25
 
Even though Khrushchev achieved one of his objectives by securing the safety of his ally, 
it was not enough to maintain his reputation. As Jeremi Suri writes, “The withdrawal of Soviet 
missiles from Cuba loomed much larger than the American noninvasion pledge. Instead of 
bolstering the international prestige of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev discredited Moscow‟s 
commitment to its allies,” most notably China. 26 Although communist China and the Soviet 
Union had always had a tepid relationship, the situation between the two deteriorated further, 
with traded criticisms becoming more public and bitter as the “Chinese press began to publish 
aggressively anti-Soviet articles.”27 Khrushchev attempted to warm Sino-Soviet relations by 
declaring a summit meeting for July 1963; the talks, however, had not concluded when the 
Chinese decided to leave the discussions.
28
 Trade and commerce all but disappeared, and 
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statements from the Chinese government stopped just short of a declaration of a “complete 
break” between the two communist powers.29 
Khrushchev‟s detractors were not only foreign but also domestic. According to Russian 
historian Peter Kenez, Khrushchev‟s yield to the United States was “humiliating” for the Soviet 
Union, and it “surely contributed to his [Khrushchev‟s] downfall.”30 Some in the Soviet camp 
would not tolerate a leader who blinked when the USSR squared off with the United States. In 
October 1964, two years after the Cuban missile crisis, Nikita Khrushchev was peaceably 
removed from power. At the meeting in which he was confronted by high-level officials, 
including later Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev, Khrushchev did not offer much opposition and 
accepted the situation as it was, saying, “I‟m old and tired… I won‟t put up a fight.”31 Alexei 
Kosygin succeeded him as Premier. 
The crisis had still more effects that produced different agreements, policies, and 
reactions. One example is the infamous “crisis hotline” that was established between Washington 
and Moscow. In addition, Ronald Steel writes that “the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis 
ironically set the stage for a more cooperative policy from Moscow, culminating in the test-ban 
treaty of 1963.”32 The treaty banned “the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in space 
and under water” and carried the signatures of seventy-seven nations by the middle of September 
1963 including the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.
33
 Following the treaty, 
Khrushchev and Kennedy met in order to discuss their desire to “pursue a policy of détente.”34 It 
is interesting to note that at those meetings, Khrushchev and Kennedy discussed the situation of 
the United States in Vietnam, about which Khrushchev made remarkably accurate predictions: 
“If you want to, go ahead and fight in the jungles of Vietnam… Perhaps the Americans will be 
able to stick it out for a little longer [than the French], but eventually they will have to quit 
too.”35 
In addition, Suri adds that “the decline in the prospects of full-scale war between the 
superpowers made direct Soviet-American confrontations far less frequent in the period after the 
Cuban missile crisis.”36 Both sides were cautious to not overly antagonize the other in order to 
avoid another crisis that might have gone beyond that of October 1962 and unleashed nuclear 
destruction.
37
 The direct result, Suri says, was an acceptance of the situation as it was, or the 
“status-quo,” in order to maintain security at the expense of progress.38 But, Suri continues, 
instead of producing the security that was so ardently sought, improved Soviet-American 
relations contributed to the destabilization of many areas of the globe that would mark the rest of 
the sixties and seventies.
39
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Although Nikita Khrushchev arguably made a serious tactical blunder by secretly sending 
nuclear-capable missiles to Cuba, his actions during the crisis, along with Kennedy‟s own 
response, prevented atomic war from scarring the globe. It is possible to speculate as to whether 
Khrushchev could have struck a better deal for the Soviet Union. Hindsight, however, provides a 
very different perspective of the situation, and Khrushchev deserves respect for setting aside his 
pride, risking his career, and withdrawing the missiles. The crisis perhaps provided a more 
realistic grasp of what nuclear war would mean to Soviet and American policy-makers, which 
produced a stronger resolve to avoid it.  
 As an afterthought, there is an interesting fact that still remains of the Cuban missile 
crisis: the Castro regime, the axle of the entire affair, is still in power on the island of Cuba. This 
has represented a thorn in the side of the United States, which has sought through various means 
to topple the island nation‟s government, including the establishment of a trade embargo that is 
still in place today. The Castro government, still dedicated to communism, despite recent, small 
changes, inspires others in the world. Socialist leaders Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Evo 
Morales of Bolivia find inspiration and friendship in the Cuban revolutionaries. And in 2007, 
Michael Moore released his documentary Sicko, which included an excursion to Cuba in which 
he praised the socialized medical system of Cuba and encouraged the United States to adopt a 
similar system. The unbroken presence of a Cuban socialist state since the crisis of 1962 is a 
successful product of Cuban-Soviet relations and continues to be a victory for the Soviet Union, 
even though it no longer exists. Thus, the Cuban missile crisis produced important consequences 
for the twentieth century, and it continues to do so in the next.  
 
 
 
